I propose a paper that examines the effectiveness of the Australian Corps during Fourth Army’s advance from Amiens to the Hindenburg Line in August and September 1918. There is no question the Corps experienced remarkable success during that period. Widely regarded as a spearhead of the Allied advance during The Hundred Days, its achievements are rightly celebrated, including those at Amiens, Mont St Quentin, Péronne, the Hindenburg Outpost Line, as well as on the Hindenburg Line itself.

However, the Australians also experienced considerable difficulties during the period that are often overlooked in the popular narrative, as the five divisions saw their combat effectiveness ground down by the relentless strain of the advance and a crippling shortage of manpower. By mid-September, commanders faced escalating issues of ill-discipline, including instances of whole-unit combat refusal. All five divisions were out of the line by 6 October; none saw action again before the Armistice.

Instead of explaining the Australian achievements in terms of a traditional, parochial narrative of national military exceptionalism, I explore the idea that the Australians operated at the height of the British army’s military effectiveness on the Western Front, and their achievements must be located in that light.